Early Encounters with Rand:
The first time I picked up Ayn Rand’s book, The Fountainhead, I was 14. Two days later I put the book down, disappointed in its colorless conclusion and offended by the arrogant indifference of its protagonist. This was around the time I was rejecting much of my childhood religious conditioning, and I didn’t give much thought to Ayn Rand for another 10 years after that initial encounter with her horrendous philosophy.
In college and my early days in grad school I went through a pro-lassiez-faire phase, arguing against social philosophies that advocated anything short of complete self-interest. Much of these arguments went down over tequila shots and canasta with Eastern European math prodigies. It was a time for much maligned thought and all that thinking was leading me in a different direction.
Eventually, I came to ponder on the idea of free-will. I began to develop a nuanced utilitarian socio-political philosophy that followed from acceptance of the moral implications of the absence of free-will.
Around this time I came across a little collection of essays put together by Rand, called “Capitalism: An Unknown Ideal”.
This time things were different. I had the tools to think with; and think I did. This time I was not just disappointed. I was appalled at how incoherent her philosophy had become to me, over the years, in light of modern science and a more rounded understanding of ethics. Moreover, the central thesis of her entire philosophy was clearly wrong!
The Central Flaws:
Tom Clark, Director at the Center for Naturalism, writes of a couple of flaws in Rand’s reasoning. These flaws in her philosophy are so fundamental that they are built into the fabric of Objectivism itself. They noticeably conspire to discredit any claims of naturalistic reason – Objectivism’s fundamental assertion! According to Tom, these flaws are:
Flaw 1: Rand’s belief and assigned importance to a non-material soul and free-will makes her philosophy non-naturalistic. No matter how much reason she uses from that premise on, it remains an ideological philosophy and not a naturalistic philosophy.
Flaw 2: Objectivism by definition makes the naturalistic fallacy. That is, you can’t go from “is” statements about the natural world to making “ought” statements about it, claiming that the “ought” follows from the “is”.
Objectivism, Free-will and Values:
Leonard Peikoff writes in his book Objectivism, the Philosophy of Ayn Rand,
A course of thought or action is 'free,' if it is selected from two or more courses possible under the circumstances.This is the subverted definition of free-will that objectivists use to defend their ideology from claims that it is non-naturalistic. By this definition of freedom, computers and even simple hand-held calculators have free-will, exercising it multiple times whenever they process any simple command. It is a definition that pointedly avoids the question of ultimate causes as addressed by naturalism. According to Sue Blackmore, there is no doubt that we make choices all the time. The illusion is in the intuition that we are free to make those choices.
The naturalistic fallacy is easier to identify in objectivist philosophy as Rand and her followers make no attempt to disguise it using subversive language. Simply put, objectivism proclaims a universal morality that it purports to derive from observing the natural world objectively. As mentioned before, this is a violation of scientific naturalism. There is no objective path from observed reality to a positivist social and personal ethics. This tradition in naturalism long predates Rand.
When Rand was asked specifically about her epistemology, she said: "I am not primarily an advocate of capitalism, but of egoism; and I am not primarily an advocate of egoism, but of reason. If one recognizes the supremacy of reason and applies it consistently, all the rest follows."
On analysis, it is obvious that neither free-will nor values flow from pure reason. Both these are extrinsic to naturalism but are inextricably tied to Rand’s philosophy. Despite her claim, Rand does not apply “the supremacy of reason" to her idea of free-will, where it should be applied, and she applies reason to ethics where (without making the naturalistic fallacy) it can not.
Natural Ethics, Sans Free-will:
If we remove these two flaws, we are left with philosophical naturalism, the idea that all that exists is natural reality- a concept that rejects the existence of any supernatural. Now, this does not have the reach of objectivism because naturalism is not influenced by moral emotions like objectivism is.
So, does the naturalistic method inform us about free-will and ethics?
I believe that it does.
The utility of reason is in describing the natural world. That is all that lies within its scope. What we do with that information garnered by reason lies beyond reason itself. I do believe that a truly naturalistic philosophy (without free-will beliefs) will inform our understanding of ethics, but the ethics doesn’t flow from reason. The abortion and stem-cell research issues, addressed here, are examples of how morality can be influenced by reason without claiming it to be part of reason itself.
When we remove the idea that there is an objective free-will, naturalism informs our ethics that our concepts of justice are based on an illusion. When we remove the naturalistic fallacy, naturalism informs us that ethics is subjective.
Understanding naturalistic ‘facts’, we can then work together to build a subjective moral code that is more consistent with the (naturalistically) observable fact that our morality is constantly evolving as cultures and our understanding of biology evolve.
Rand’s philosophy, if taken to its extreme interpretation, can lead to a form of Social Darwinism. This shows the dangers in making the naturalistic fallacy. There are those on the left who have made this fallacy before as well in order to support their claims (for example, E.O. Wilson). In fact, Wilson’s sociobiology-derived leftist interpretation of ethics is at least based on a more recent and scientific understanding of social systems and human group behavior. The fact is that he makes the naturalistic fallacy, nevertheless.
The Objectivist’s Motives:
Rand’s argument, as she has stated often, is that selfishness is best for the common good. What she failed to understand is that the kind of “selfish” actions that are actually needed for the common good of the species is actually governed by self-less emotions at the individual level. Biological altruism is selfish behavior at the genetic level, but at the emotional level it is self-less. The selfishness arises as a genetic fitness advantage that the individual is not consciously calculating. Rand’s excuse for her moral philosophy is based on a false understanding of biological altruism. Sociology theory has moved well away from such idealistic concepts as Rand’s, but the dogmas still prevail in politics and economics, where power rather than free-flow of ideas is the norm. Economic theory has, in recent years, started to take into account the discoveries of sociological theory of the last four decades. Until the recent market collapse, Rand’s ideological cohorts such as Alan Greenspan had aggressively imposed the morally and economically empty dogma of unregulated free-market economics, using power and subterfuge rather than academic legitimacy.
I recently wrote about The Atlantic’s Andrew Sullivan and how it was possible for him to realize that being gay does not involve free-will - since he happens to be gay - while he still cannot see how being under-privileged might also not. Sullivan happens to think that being gay is genetically determined and therefore must not be prejudiced against, while he asserts that the poor deserve their misfortunes. This is compartmentalization of one’s understanding of free-will; it doesn’t exist when you suffer the negative social consequences of a certain condition, and it does when others are suffering from a different form of prejudice.
This is a form of selfishness that must be, to some extent, intrinsic to certain people.
It is very likely that if Rand was born as one of those lesser minds that her cold-hearted lead-characters flick to the side on their way to the top, she may have had different ideas about free-will. Arguably, she was too clouded by her illusions of free-will and grandeur to be aware of her own lapses of reason.
22 comments:
"Flaw 1: Rand’s belief and assigned importance to a non-material soul and free-will makes her philosophy non-naturalistic. No matter how much reason she uses from that premise on, it remains an ideological philosophy and not a naturalistic philosophy."
So when you have a thought, is it material or is it somewhat like a computer image? The image on disk is a string of interpretable binary code that, when translated by the video card, shows up as neatly arranged pixels that present a pretty real image for us. Was the binary code non-material?
Of course it was not, and the same is true of the soul and of free will. Those two concepts refer to concepts of mind which are, fundamentally, the ACTIONS of the mind. One might argue that runningis "non-material"; but no sane person would argue that running can occur without something doing the running. Running is an action, but it is every bit as material as thinking. The soul is the same as the soul, it is an action, as is free will. Such thjings are material, but they are not "substantive'.
Know the difference.
Beyond the ken of Tom Clark, actions are natural, and so are the very actions of the mind; the consciousness that has volition and a soul (with 'storage' in the subconscious neural brain) is no less natural than a horse's whinny (though a heck of a lot more sophisticated).
Bottom line on Flaw 1: Tom Clark completely failed to understand Rand, and proceeded to argue against her as if his confusions were her fault!
___
"Flaw 2: Objectivism by definition makes the naturalistic fallacy. That is, you can’t go from “is” statements about the natural world to making “ought” statements about it, claiming that the “ought” follows from the “is”.
You provide no explanation for this bizarre claim.
* If one "is" to raise water to the top of a hill, one "ought" to be sure they will have a suitable engineering method, and energy source, to achieve it.
* If one "is" to live, one "ought" to adhere to the requirements of life (food, shelter, safety etc.).
* If one "is" to be happy, one "ought" to constrain one's activities to those *rational* things that bring happiness.
Why "rationally"? Because a man is not genetically equiped with speed and sharp teeth for hunting. Because man does have a conceptual mind? He knows of his own happiness, so it follows, after food, shelter & safety, that he must *understand* those things which affirm his conceptual abilities. Much as a horse loves to run, a man loves to experience that which makes his mind 'run'. He lves to see his ideas, for action in the real world, succeed. He loves to see his view of the World (metaphysics, right or wrong) be affirmed. Such is the achievement of Art, right or wrong.
Art is able to provide the "ought".
All of that is natural. More importantly, it is Objective. It fits the real World, taking into account &/or including, the Nature of Man.
You wrote,
"On analysis, it is obvious that neither free-will nor values flow from pure reason.".
This seems to be reminiscent of Immanuel Kant. So, reason and perception are invalid??
Above, we may see a hint of the incredible nature of reason, by connecting the Real World "is", with the Ethical "ought", the captives show, "Free Will" & I can can be understood by reason, but this is because the enemy rejects reason. And, values, most definitely, can be grasped by detecting the "ought". Just do the right thing, by which you will gety a good sleeo.!
Read Rand with a lot more care. Read Peikoff's "Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand" (OPAR) with more care/ Heck, answer the questions in Gary Hull's Study Guide to OPAR as if you were responding to the greatest genius in the history. Yep, I am sorry, but you have missed the real value Ayn Rand.provided you.
1. Despite your attempts to defend the metaphorical mind and soul, you have not offered any empirical defense of a real free-will. Even if the former two exist in any possible form be it real, imagined, material, "substantive" or anything in-between, there is no reason why they should be free and non-deterministic. In fact, all the real SCIENCE points to a deterministic mind (metaphorical or "material"), leading to the conclusion that the will is pre-determined as well . Maybe you are having trouble understanding what it means to be objectively "free".
You make a big deal of how action and consciousness are natural (revelation indeed!) but fail to see the deterministic implications of that commonly understood fact.
The dualistic vs monistic nature of
mental processes does not address the question of the freedom of the will. In any case, dualism is a dead philosophy in the scientific understanding of reality, something that Rand would have appreciated had she lived in modern times.
You make a huge leap in logic from positing a "material" "soul", which I will grant you for argument sake although there is no scientific and reasonable evidence for this, to claiming that this is somehow evidence for free-will (if I understand you right). In fact, you do not specifically address the claim that free-will exists at all, but simply profess a deep and irrational conviction in its existence. Remember, even if the will exists, science proposes that it is pre-determined by causative effects, and therefore not free.
2. If you just had googled "naturalistic fallacy", you will understand that it is not a "bizzare claim" and is in fact one of the best established tenets of scientific philosophy.
Your entire defense consists of redefining is and ought statements about the natural world by just using the words "is" and "ought" in their regular meaning. This is a confusion wrought by misunderstanding what constitutes factual statements and action statements.
When you say:
"If one "is" to raise water to the top of a hill",
you are not stating an unconditional fact. You will note that in the article I said " you can’t go from “is” statements about the natural world to making “ought” statements about it". The "is" statements about the natural world in your example would be, for example: A bucket exists, Water exists at the bottom of the hill, A hill is present. etc.,
The "ought" is the entirety of the action statement : "..one ought to be sure they will have a suitable engineering method, and energy source, to achieve it"
The part "If one is to raise water to the top of a hill", is not an "is" statement about the natural world because it is conditionally set by the subjective observer. It is not a natural fact. It is, in fact, the missing link between the "is" statements about the natural world and the "ought" statements. It is based on the value proposition that one may desire to take the water up the hill. actual "is" statements saying that there exist water, the person, the hill, etc do not lead directly to the "ought" statements except through the implied subjective values statements that are non-naturalistic in nature. I have clearly expressed the subjective nature of value statements in the article itself.
This seems like such an obvious mistake that I can tell that you are clearly not familiar with the concept of the naturalistic fallacy at all.
Iit is not conducive to even argue your point because you do not seem to understand that the naturalistic fallacy is an established tenet of scientific philosophy. Please take the time to look into it.
You quote me saying, "On analysis, it is obvious that neither free-will nor values flow from pure reason.", and follow it up with your statement:
"This seems to be reminiscent of Immanuel Kant. So, reason and perception are invalid?"
Yes, thats exactly what I said right? If free-will and values don't flow from pure reason, then reason and perception are invalid. Seriously, if you are going to misrepresent me why the heck would actually quote my statement and make your deception so obvious? Or is that just how you see it? If you read the article I have clearly assigned the role of reason in informing our morality, among other things. Please go ahead and read the section "Natural Ethics, Sans Free-will:", again.
At least Rand was aware of some of the science of her day, which is more than I can say of her followers.
If Miss Rand were alive she wouldn't say a word. She'd just flick her cigarette at you and walk away.
I'll tarry a moment.
First of all, as Richard has noted, there are many outright errors in this piece regarding Rand's position and thought. Many. So many that the construction of a "straw man" is not even attained.
Second, Naturalism is a dishonest philosophy.
I had to look up 'naturalism' at one of your links, never heard of it as an organized system before.
So, in Naturalism there is no position from which a person is responsible for the making of his own soul. As a matter of fact, "soul" is an invalid concept, even if defined with no supernatural element. Nope, a person is not a soul, he is just a collection of glowing energy and happenstance that got to its place in the space-time continuum through mechanistic causation out of the moment prior. One's awayness of self and will and autonomy -- these are illusions
Nor is a person 'responsible' for his actions. It might be determined by science that his actions were indeed acted by him (hurray science!); there is no moral content to that, however. No willed causation. For instance, the only thing that produced the piece you wrote was that you could not do otherwise. Things just tumbled together and low and behold out of the blue through no choice of yours, an attack on Ayn Rand suddenly appeared on your hard drive. A billion monkeys with a billion typewriters in a billion years would likely have typed it out with the same level of causation.
What a miracle! Despite the above bankrupt insanity, you still manage to privilege an area here and there that ought (another miracle, an 'ought') to be managed, one assumes by some form of Skinnerian behavior modification, namely
"our naturally endowed empathetic concern for others and our hard-wired penchant for cooperation and reciprocity get us what we most want as social creatures: to flourish as individuals within a community. "
http://naturalism.org/tenetsof.htm
... and...
"...the kind of “selfish” actions that are actually needed for the common good of the species is actually governed by self-less emotions at the individual level. Biological altruism is selfish behavior at the genetic level, but at the emotional level it is self-less. " [blank-out how 'emotional level' attained valorized status] [blank out how selflessness is vital to the common good; unless immolation is needed.]
I am at a loss for words to explain how this 'penchant' could be protected from destruction by its enemies (sociopaths, individualists, etc) without someone letting go the clutch and choosing to act. (whew what a relief to let myself say those last three words, i could hardly breathe.)
okay, I can unpack this. This is a flavor of radical skepticism. The business about no will is an attempt to take a hatchet to the Gordian Knot of radical skepticism, namely its self-invalidating axiomatic belief "There are no absolutes. Objectivists easily handle the garden variety radical skeptic who claims "there are no absolutes" with the deadly rejoinder "Are you absolutely sure of that?" Many radical skeptics are in such denial that they don't even realize they have been fatally attacked with that response. They often respond "Yes" with a happy face. That is just hilarious, but also quite sickening.
But this naturalism....this is something fully aware "There are no absolutes" is self-voiding. So, start by allowing "science" to have a lot of certainty. That throws off the hounds right there. (usually radical skeptics dispute that scientific knowledge is anything but a constructed social prejudice quite early in any argument, wrecking the party.) Don't worry that someone might say that science had to be started up by someone or that science must flow forth from the brain of scientists, or that those guys had to let the clutch out once in a while and decide -- elect -- will -- to think.
Then, throw in a heavy denial of "first causation" in order to stave off theists. If we have infinite regress of mechanistic causation there is no need for will anywhere along the chain (certainly don't stop at the illusory demarcation known as 'a person'), and the only thing to gainsay our position would be if the buck stops. So, just deny a first cause and you've denied all cause.
But that pesky spark of motive power in a person, that is troublesome. It could be the undeniable marker of an Absolute. The Absolute truth that a human individual's body is not his and someone elses at the same time, his consciousness is not his and someone else's at the same time, this could wreck the plan. Such an atomistic being would be difficult to account for under the typical collectivist umbrella, since we can't claim the collectivism is willed. Moreover, if the collectivism is only one strain of feeling in the culture, isn't that fatal since choosing it over another strain would be anathema under Naturalism? . Moreover what if an substantial majority of a culture arose whose individual citizens had a penchant for privacy and freedom from forced community, forced reciprocity, forced cooperation? Disaster.
Then, what if you had a brilliant mind whose works were loved by millions -- millions of individuals -- who said "Man is a being of volitional consciousness."
Sorry, it is dishonest to deny will, yet will ascendancy for a certain 'penchant' -- one penchant out of many -- namely selfless duty devoid of inclination, choice, volition and moral value.
John Donohue
Pasadena, CA
Good 'unpacking', as you tarry, Mr. Donahue.
John, ajita kamal wrote to me (note my bolding):
"2. If you just had googled "naturalistic fallacy", you will understand that it is not a "bizzare claim" and is in fact one of the best established tenets of scientific philosophy.
His use of "If" above is a presumption of choice. (Human volition is why language has such words as "if", "else", "or", "maybe", etc..) So, while denying free will, he is effectively arguing that I could have chosen to google "naturalistic fallacy" and, thereby, discover that I have no free choice! It would be funny if he was not serious.
The claim that scientists deny free will is quite true, but their studies are designed on the a priori presumption of Determinism. Generally speaking, their studies provide some interesting facts about neural centers, pathways and certain behaviors. The scientists' first conclude the observed data indicate a neural Response to some Stimulus. They next conclude the behavior was Determined because they had observed the pathway. They end, arguing free will was not involved, usually with an implicit "See, we knew it all along."
Their chain of rationalizations, from the initial facts to the conclusion of Determinism, is often lengthy, and fraught with omissions. By design, however implicit, the rationalizations ignore where free will might come into play. Using such 'science' and 'logic', these men could just as easily argue that the facts proved they had found the free will center of the brain!
Free will can be experienced by any normal mind, simply by introspecting and observing one's choices. Children can understand it but adults —reading tortured philosophical arguments and following 'science' conducted by adults whose minds are already made up— cannot understand it. (One could say they suffer from Determinism ;-)
What is really funny is that ajita kamal has chosen to argue with me, to get me to change my mind.
Hey ajita, I can't, you give me no choice! LOL
Hiya Richard, yes I find this corner of the argument interesting as one of the more bold ways for POC people to attempt to get from the inside to the outside.
Your identification of the preponderance of rationalization strikes to the core. When you see it, you wonder what it is they are attempting to get around. In this case, the attempt might be to slough off judgment and any normative system. "Just the facts, and they don't having anything to do with value judgement." Additionally, ( and "nonetheless"), the normative ethos valorized by Naturalism has a vested interest in morality being "other-oriented" and thus Rand would be an explicit anttipode.
Since Miss Rand was misrepresented above, a quote would be in order, and this might help cut to the chase.
"It is only an ultimate goal, and end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible.”
In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between “is” and “ought.”"
-- Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness
An appropriate quotation, John.
I have long taught (using easier language suitable for senior high students) that the conceptual faculty requires, and could not function without volition. To form a concept, one must begin by recognizing 1) a concrete's relationship to other, less related, concretes; and 2) the essential commonalities among the concretes of interest. That means one MUST be able to *choose* what essential characteristics are of concern (i.e. are a "value"), either to oneself or to any reasoning mind.
Aristotle included bats (Mammals) with birds (Aves), because they shared a remarkable ability enabled by wings. Others have considered bats to be flying mice (closer). The concept "bat" had to progress through the choices available to the men studying it.
No robotic A.I. system could do such a thing as formulate a new concept, because a) a new concept means a new perspective on certain information that is to be unitized to a single word (term), and b) it requires knowing why that information matters ...not only to Life, but to the goals and actions (the "values") of a particular life —that of the mind involved!
The robot's A.I. would have to ask it's programmer what is *interesting*, what matters? Or, if really sophisticated, it would then have to ask what values it should consider. At no point can it *ultimately* make the choice itself.
Volition and concept formation are inseparable. They differentiate Man from Animals to the same degree that Animals differ from Plants.
In all these arguments you both have presented I am yet to see any empirical statements. All your arguments break down to a gut feeling; one that free-will exists and the other that values are objective.
Since you ignore my repeated attempts to invoke empiricism, let me ignore your mumbo-jumbo and just address the Rand quote that you (John) presented:
"It is only an ultimate goal, and end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible"
Translation:
I feel that values are objective because I experience life.
Naturalism does not argue that values are outside of life; in fact the argument is that values are subjectively dependent on individual emotional states. The part naturalists are opposed to is the labeling of this emotional value as an objective fact of the universe.
The universe does not care if life exists of not. In assigning value to life, you (and Rand) are already in subjective territory. In claiming objective status, you (and Rand) show ignorance in understanding the concept of objectivity.
Empirical evidence presupposes, demands, an observer of the world outside of himself and his emotions who establishes the truth of the evidence by an effort of focus, observation, discrimination and valuation. You told us the brains of people only operate though happenstance and emotion, not will or moral judgement. Speaking for myself, I therefore am speechless.
All I can hear echoing in my skull is "cart before horse, cart before horse."
"You told us the brains of people only operate though happenstance and emotion, not will or moral judgement"
Wrong again. I said values are emotional states and therefore subjective. Nature itself has an objective reality that can only be truly addressed by empirical reasoning. Science and empiricism replaces the need for an "outside observer" by testability, replicability and falsifiability.
Metaphor, metaphor, metaphor...but not once right.
John wrote, quoting Rand:
"It is only an ultimate goal, and end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of “value” is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of “life.” To speak of “value” as apart from “life” is worse than a contradiction in terms. “It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible"
Translation:
"I feel that values are objective because I experience life."
You MIS-translate, notably by ignoring the term "only" and thereby missing the fundamental point. You know perfectly well that without life, values are impossible, unless you subscribe to such nonsense as life after death (a blatant contradiction).
Your "I feel" element is entirely a projection of your own disregard for the *inescapable reality* of the volitional basis of reason. Such is the nature of rationalization!
I contest that your rationalism has an underlying agenda seeking to "paper over" the inherent dishonesty required to deny volition and reason.
Come to think of it, you are denying reason... why am I responding at all? ...nothing can change your view. You, EXPLICITLY, wish to evade thought... hence your support for Determinism. Determinism absolves you of any responsibility for whatever thoughts happen to transit across your mind.
I am the fool for suggesting alternatives you could consider -consideration being a matter of free will.
“You know perfectly well that without life, values are impossible, unless you subscribe to such nonsense as life after death (a blatant contradiction).”
Did you even read the line just after the one you quoted me saying? Here it is:
“Naturalism does not argue that values are outside of life; in fact the argument is that values are subjectively dependent on individual emotional states. The part naturalists are opposed to is the labeling of this emotional value as an objective fact of the universe.”
If you had read that you would see how absurd your statement is. I specifically say that values are dependent on life. The problem with you is that you fail to see the distinction between subjective reality that values are dependent on and objective reality that is the nature of the universe.
As mentioned more than once (and stated explicitly in the article), you keep missing the point about will. Naturalists do not deny that volition exists. Every past action of ours depended on choices that were made and every future action depends on those that we will. The distinction you have consistently failed to see is that these choices are causally determined. Therefore, there is no free-volition. Both the ego and its choices have natural causes.
Objactivists reject the God of creation. On that, we’re on the same page. An all powerful entity could not have created all there is and nature must have causative antecedents that are also natural in character. But objectivists cling on to little Gods (perhaps due to the inability to reject the illusion). Human beings are somehow believed to be causal exceptions to nature. If you are so keen on denying causal determinants to volition and consciousness, you are subscribing supernatural causes to them. There lie your little gods.
You say
“Determinism absolves you of any responsibility for whatever thoughts happen to transit across your mind”
This is fatalism, not to be confused with naturalistic determinism. It is the weakest and yet most common critique of naturalism because it stems from the illusion of free-will itself. I highly suggest you read the linked articles but I will quote Bob Miller from his piece saying “The fatalist position is that ‘if I do not have free will, then my life is totally determined by the outside world, therefore my beliefs and desires have no effect on the outside world, and therefore no matter what I do the same things will happen to me’. Of course, it is empirically demonstrable that our behavior affects the environment and thus what happens to us”
Many of the claims you have made in your arguments are simply outdated and do not reflect the modern understanding on the subjects. I suggest you look into some of the current literature on free-will starting here. If you keep ignoring the vast new literature on these subjects and keep reverting to mid 20th century popular philosophy while ignoring modern empiricism, I must accuse you of dogmatism.
It is not me but you who are unwilling to change his positions in light of empirical data. You keep making the mistake of assuming that just because one can “consider” that such “considering” has no natural causes. “Considering” is not a matter of free-will, as you dogmatically keep espousing, but a matter of will, determined by natural causes and affected by the same.
I have no doubt that you will return to ignore all the empirical research and the arguments I have laid out, and pick on some irrelevant point as you did with your last response. After all, objectivists are famous for their swollen egos that bruise easily. I am not about to concede to ideological charges just because you keep accusing me of being the dogmatic one, despite yourself being the one with the ideological impetus to keep ignoring the rational arguments that have been laid out before you.
My view of free will arises from observing my own mental actions, and I see the same outward manifestations in other people (including you). It is not a mid 20th century argument.
Perhaps you are quibbling over terminology (compatibilism and all), but in the end you always demand entry into the intellectual void:
"Naturalists do not deny that volition exists. Every past action of ours depended on choices that were made and every future action depends on those that we will. The distinction you have consistently failed to see is that these choices are causally determined. Therefore, there is no free-volition."
The verbiage in between the bolded parts applies to animals and non-living events, but it does not apply to normal human beings. Nor does it brings us from the first sentence to the last... the paragraph is a non sequitur.
We can quite legitimately remove the verbiage in between the bolded parts to get to the void you wish me to enter:
"Naturalists do not deny that volition exists...Therefore, there is no free-volition..
Black is white, up is down, A is non-A, reason is non-reason, the real is unreal, something is nothing, you exist and you do not exist.
If your vacuous claims are accurate expressions of the 'science', you read then what you are reading is not science. You would certainly be much better off if you thought for yourself.
The full paragraph that you quoted was:
"As mentioned more than once (and stated explicitly in the article), you keep missing the point about will. Naturalists do not deny that volition exists. Every past action of ours depended on choices that were made and every future action depends on those that we will. The distinction you have consistently failed to see is that these choices are causally determined. Therefore, there is no free-volition. Both the ego and its choices have natural causes."
There is no non sequitor there if you are capable of understanding English. Since volition is naturally caused, it is not free. Get it?
As I predicted near the end of my previous comment, you ignored all my rational arguments to pick on some irrelevant side issue. Did you even read the entire comment?
Your dogmatic state of denial is characteristic of objectivists who are simply intent on justifying their extremist ideology with the pretense of reason. The minute you are presented with rational counter-arguments, you retreat to your high-horse obfuscating the conversation using irrelevant metaphors and puncing at straw-men of your own making.
Go read some real philosophy.
“Leonard Peikoff writes in his book Objectivism, the Philosophy of Ayn Rand,
A course of thought or action is 'free,' if it is selected from two or more courses possible under the circumstances.”
If a tennis ball is hit by a racket we tend to think it must take the course it does given it is in the circumstances it is in. I don’t want to argue this is true but want to make the point that when we are thinking like this, we are also including the state of the tennis ball in the circumstances, as the tennis ball could behave differently if there was something different about it. This is how I think the word circumstances needs to be used when talking about free will.
If we use the word circumstances in this way, it follows that we never select between two or more courses of action that we could take in the circumstances when we make choices because in order to select a different option, there would have to be something different about us, which would therefore mean we’d have to be in different circumstances.
So if I’m choosing between chocolate and vanilla ice cream and pick chocolate because I prefer it, I couldn’t select vanilla ice cream unless there was something different about me (or my external environment).
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousStrawsonG.html
“The facts are clear, and they have been known for a long time. When it comes to the metaphysics of free will, André Gide’s remark is apt: ‘Everything has been said before, but since nobody listens we have to keep going back and beginning all over again’. It seems that the only freedom that we can have is compatibilist freedom. If—since—that is not enough for ultimate responsibility, we cannot have ultimate responsibility. The only alternative to this conclusion is to appeal to God and mystery—this in order to back up the claim that something that appears to be provably impossible is not only possible but actual.” Galen Strawson
So if the facts are clear why do people disagree over the facts? They disagree for at least four reasons.
I) Is because the definition of free will tends to move around, so people jump to the conclusion that if they don’t have incompatibilist free will they don’t have will or volition, or don’t make choices or decisions.
II) Because people are under the impression that they experience having free will when in fact they don’t.
III) Because people think incompatibilist free will is something worth wanting.
IV) Because people erroneously believe that to be able to select between options, we need to be able to select any one of them in the circumstances.
Why think incompatibilist free will is worth wanting? When I select chocolate ice cream because I prefer it, what use would the ability to select vanilla ice cream in the circumstances be?
Why believe we experience having free will? Assuming we stick to the above definition, it doesn’t seem like we have free will when we make choices. It doesn’t feel like I could pick a vanilla ice cream in the circumstances in which I pick a chocolate ice cream. What we all believe is that I could have picked vanilla ice cream if I’d wanted to i.e. if I was in different circumstances - but in the circumstances??
People often report the experience of choice making as a weighing up of the options and selecting the best one, or the winner of this weighing up process. Clearly if this accurately describes the experience, it’s only if the weighing up process had been different that a different selection could take place.
Stephen
The appeal to the subjective feeling or intuition of libertarian free will (which our Objectivists have made several times, e.g., "Free will can be experienced by any normal mind, simply by introspecting and observing one's choices") is unsustainable as good evidence for actually having such a thing (Stephen's 2nd point above). Such an appeal puts them in league with supernaturalist theists such as Stuart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro and anti-naturalist theologians such as John F. Haught, who think subjective experience is good grounds for believing in god, the soul and libertarian free will. To back up their claim for having free will, they would have to produce intersubjective, public evidence that human beings are uncaused causers in some respect, and thus far there is no such evidence. What Goetz and Taliaferro call first-person data are never reliable proof of anything. For Objectivists to live up to their name, they would have to justify their factual claims by appeal to empirical investigation, exemplified by science, not their intuitions (however widely shared) and not the charismatic authority of Rand. Any valid claim to objectivity pushes us toward intersubjective empiricism and thus a naturalism that calls libertarian free will into question - see for instance Realty and its rivals.
Oops, that should have read Reality and its rivals.
Stephen, I think your analysis of the free will issue is spot on, but of course you won't likely convince those who think that in order to be really free, and make real choices, we have to have genuine alternative possibilities in the circumstances that obtain at the time of choice.
One reason people think they need this sort of free will (and the Objectivists refer to it a lot) is that they suppose there's an antinomy between determinism and rationality. Their intuition might be that if the brain processes supporting their reasoning and choosing are deterministic, then how can they have sufficient causal independence from the situation to permit a rational assessment of it? My answer would be that the counterfactual reasoning we usually engage in when assessing a situation or an argument, although (likely) deterministic, is at a sufficient causal remove (although not causally disconnected). Deliberation presents to us, in thought, possibilities for action and argument that may not be immediately given in or demanded by the environment, and that's all we need. We don't need libertarian de novo freedom, nor would that do us any good since we want our deliberations to be constrained by such things as evidence, logic, reliable rules of action, etc.
But of course if someone believes that rationality depends on being causally privileged over nature, it will seem to them that anyone arguing for determinism is in blatant self-contradiction. Which is exactly what we see in the comments here. For a recent account of how rationality and lack of libertarian free will can coexist, see Warren Brown and Nancey Murphy’s book Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?.
Here's the correct link for the Murphy and Brown book:
http://www.naturalism.org/murphy.htm
Tom wrote:
"The appeal to the subjective feeling or intuition of libertarian free will (which our Objectivists have made several times, e.g., "Free will can be experienced by any normal mind, simply by introspecting and observing one's choices") is unsustainable as good evidence for actually having such a thing (Stephen's 2nd point above)."
This is true but if I experienced free will I would be reticent about rejecting it. The reason I reject it is because I don't. I also claim that nobody else does, they just think they do. It is not true that "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it." as Samuel Johnson wrote.
Here is an example of somebody describing their experience of choice making.
"Every time I want to post a letter, I have choices. Do I run across and post it, leaving Daniel alone for less than 5 mins? Do I take him with me? Do I ask a neighbour or a friend to watch him? And I reason out these choices. Option 1 is bad because it means I am leaving my son in danger. Option 3 is a bit drastic for just 2-3 mins. So Option 2 is what I choose. I choose to take him with me."
Here is Nia describing the experience of making a choice. There is nothing about this experience that indicates that she could select a different option. Far from it, if you knew her you would know she loves her son and would be horrified at the thought of leaving him in danger. If asked if she'd ever do such a thing she'd say "No!"
And yet having described the experience, she then goes on to add a a belief that she has which is:
"I could equally choose to do something else."
Nia doesn't experience being able to equally choose to do anything else, she only experiences having the belief that she could.
Stephen
Hi Richard,
Our observation of others’ decision-making struggles leaves open the question of whether there’s something contra-causal going on. To determine whether there is or not, we have to understand what’s involved in the decision-making process. Although our understanding of the brain is still in the early stages, there’s no indication thus far in our observations and inductions that there’s anything non-deterministic or ultimately self-caused in the neural mechanisms that subserve decision-making.
All science is of course observational in the sense of requiring observation of public objects and data, but personal introspection doesn’t count as science because there’s no public object involved, only one’s own experience. Of course, reports of experiences count as public data (Dennett’s heterophenomenology), but we can’t take such reports as accurate indicators of what’s outside the head. We don’t trust reports of having experienced alien abduction as good evidence for having really been abducted. Same goes for reports of having the experience of libertarian free will; see here about what I call the public object requirement for making factual claims.
I don’t pretend to know what Rand and her followers mean precisely by free will, I only offer the standard naturalistic cautions when people claim they have a special sort of contra-causal freedom that nothing else in nature has.
Due to spamming by objectivists intent more on making personal attacks rather than providing rational justification for their ideology, I have closed comments on this post. If you wish to debate/talk to others who do not believe in free-will, you could visit http://atheistnexus.org/group/freewilldne
Ajita
Update (In response to the first 4 comments to this article) :
This update is to clear up some of the confusion expressed by the objectivists in the comments to this article. In the initial part of the debate, the two objectivists Richard and John Donohue exchange comments motivated by misunderstandings and confusion. These comments were not addressed because I entered the discussion late. I will address these initial comments here. The confusion in the later comments have been addressed and sorted out by Tom Clark, Stephen and myself.
The two objectivists Richard and John, demonstrate common objectivists' misunderstanding of the naturalist claim that free-will does not exist. The misunderstanding is in part semantic, although objectivists certainly exhibit confirmation bias, behaving like religious apologists all too often. “Free-will” implies a supernatural origin for mental choices. This kind of free-will is what naturalists contest. Objectivists need to assign an apriori value to this idea of a supernatural soul in order to justify their cold and selfish political ideas. In Richard's initial comment, he tries to argue that free-will and soul are actually material. In doing so, he defines free-will and soul as naturally caused. Of course, such a definition of free-will and soul is altering the conditions behind the core of Objectivist philosophy- If there are natural causes to free-will, then all that is left is “will”. All choices are determined by natural causes and there is nothing “free” about it. The “free” is the illusion. The soul, as a metaphor of a material reality, does not offer anything to the Objectivists' argument.
In the above argument Richard actually demonstrates why Objectivism is empty ideology based on an illusion.
The other Objectivist, John Donohue, enters the debate with a very typical Objectivist attitude, claiming that Rand would “just flick her cigarette at you and walk away”, thus demonstrating the cold lack of compassion that objectivists have, which leads them to justify their selfish ideology using the claim that free-will exists and is the ultimate cause of human action.
He begins with the unsubstantiated claim that there are many errors in the article, and excuses himself from naming any. From there John rambles on in ignorance until he makes it clear that he has no idea how causation works. He then misrepresents the naturalistic perspective (calling us “radical skeptics”) by claiming that naturalism implies that there are no absolutes! This is a straw man argument. John actually seems to be unaware that the philosophy of science is based on naturalism.
Thus John's argument rambles on until he finally talks about the Objectivist version of evil, “collectivism”. He then proceeds to state that since “collectivism” would be non-naturalistic as well, my argument is flawed, implying that my argument is an argument for “collectivism”. This demonstrates the stark black and white perspective that objectivists see the world through. All ideologues see things from an “us vs them” perspective. Of course “collectivism”, however Objectivists define that, would also be non-naturalistic. No where in my refutation of Objectivism was I embracing “collectivism”. The thing to recognize is that morality requires emotional judgment, informed by reason. There is no need to be ideologically aligned with any particular political formula. Naturalism just recognizes where the boundaries of reason lie. This is the essence of the naturalistic fallacy.
In the next two comments, they attack the naturalistic fallacy, without having a clue as to how cause and effect works.
(continued)
(continued from previous comment)
John presents a really idiotic quote from Rand, asserting that life itself contains value, objectively. Apparently, the fact that this supernaturalistic assertion has been the entire focus of my article has escaped him.
On presenting an argument using the analogy of artificial intelligence, he says:
“The robot's A.I. would have to ask it's programmer what is *interesting*, what matters? Or, if really sophisticated, it would then have to ask what values it should consider. At no point can it *ultimately* make the choice itself.”
This is true! We are just like robots and computers in this regard. This actually validates my assertions. It is only the deluded thinking that humans are an exception to this law of reality that leads John to assume that this argument actually works in his favor.
Much of this confusion arises because John cannot see how natural causes can induce mental choices. Of course, a robot will need to have some natural cause help it determine what the value of “interesting” is, given specific parameters. So too does life! We have all been programmed. The fact that biological programming is extremely plastic, adaptive and arbitrary is the reason why people like John (and most of humanity) operate under the illusion that there is a more than functional difference between robots and humans. This is an illusion. There always is an external cause, and if it feels like one's choices are “free” that is the illusion of sentient life that made it possible for animals like us to respond to our environment by communicating with it. This is the mechanistic entirety of experience.
After this point, Richard and John keep repeating that the fact that I am making choices discredits my assertions about free-will. For example Richard says:
“What is really funny is that ajita kamal has chosen to argue with me, to get me to change my mind.
Hey ajita, I can't, you give me no choice! LOL”
LOL, indeed. Of course this is a fact. As repeated numerous times, the fact that we all make choices does not mean that those choices are supernaturally motivated. The above statements only support my assertions about the nature of will (by the fact that it is causally determined). There is a difference between, “naturally caused will” and “free will”. The former is a fact of the universe (in biological organisms and in computers). The latter is an illusion.
Throughout the first few comments, Richard and John obfuscate the issues, misunderstand the philosophy of naturalism, don't comprehend the naturalistic fallacy, don't get how experience is subjective relying on natural causes, don't understand cause and effect and blindly defend their fallacious ideology without a shred of intellectual honesty. In short, exactly what one would expect from an Objectivist.
The rest of the comments have been addressed in the comments section.
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